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BRAND NAME REPLICAS AND BANK 
SECRECY: EXPLORING ATTITUDES AND 
ANXIETIES TOWARDS CHINESE BANKS IN 
THE TIFFANY AND GUCCI CASES 
 
Megan C. Chang* & Terry E. Chang** 
INTRODUCTION 
Three back-to-back cases decided within ten months, between July 
2011 and May 2012, addressed the issue of whether Chinese banks could be 
compelled under U.S. federal civil procedure rules to disclose information 
about account holders who were alleged to have engaged in manufacturing 
and selling counterfeit goods. Although each of the cases was decided in the 
Second Circuit and shared nearly identical facts, their holdings spanned a 
wide spectrum. In Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew,1 Judge Henry Pitman 
held that plaintiffs should seek production of the relevant documents 
through the Hague Convention rather than compelling production pursuant 
to a federal subpoena under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP 45).2 Decided less than one month later, however, Gucci America, 
Inc. v. Li held the reverse.3 In Gucci, Judge Richard J. Sullivan ordered the 
Chinese bank to turn over the documents sought by plaintiffs pursuant to 
FRCP 45, finding that a request made to the Chinese government through 
the Hague Convention would not be a “viable alternative.”4 In Tiffany (NJ) 
LLC v. Forbse, Judge Naomi Buchwald split her ruling—deciding that one 
defendant (the Bank of China) would be required to produce documents 
pursuant to the federal subpoena, whereas the other defendants (the 
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 1. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 160–61. The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, to which the U.S. is also a party, was signed by the 
People’s Republic of China in 1991 and entered into force in 1992. See Status Table, 14: 
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www 
.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17. 
 3. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 
2011). 
 4. Id. at *8–9.  
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Merchants Bank) 
could be queried through a Hague Convention request.5 
What is interesting is that the disparate holdings resulted from the same 
five-factor comity analysis—a balancing test applied pursuant to section 
442(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law when a 
conflict of laws issue arises. Looking at which factors Judges Pitman, 
Sullivan, and Buchwald disagreed upon reveals subtle Western attitudes 
towards both China’s willingness to comply with international discovery 
procedures and the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of China’s interest in its 
bank secrecy laws. 
This Article first discusses the background of all three cases. Part II 
presents the issues and arguments asserted in each case. Part III explores the 
courts’ comity analyses and concludes, in Part IV, with a discussion of the 
attitudes and anxieties toward China that these cases unveil.  
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASES 
A.  TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. QI ANDREW  
In December 2010, the plaintiffs Tiffany (NJ) LLC and Tiffany and 
Company (together, Tiffany & Co.), a high-end jewelry designer and 
manufacturer, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) against alleged online sellers of 
counterfeit goods whose websites were hosted in the United States.6 The 
defendants’ websites included Tiffanystores.org, which sold knockoffs of 
Tiffany & Co.’s signature silver pendants (retailing at $345) for a mere $24, 
among other Tiffany & Co. jewelry.7 
Tiffany & Co. claimed that the defendants’ customers made payments 
through PayPal in U.S. dollars and that the profits were transferred to the 
Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), and China Merchants Bank (CMB) (collectively, the Banks).8 
Defendants did not respond to the complaint filed by Tiffany & Co. nor did 
they respond to a court order requiring the production of documents related 
to their alleged counterfeiting operation;9 thus, Tiffany & Co. sought, inter 
alia, production of all records in the Banks’ “possession, custody, or control 
. . . concerning the assets and financial transactions of Defendants . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 
23, 2012). 
 6. Complaint at 2–5, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 
10 Civ. 9471), 2010 WL 5172567.  
 7. Emily Flitter, Insight: Gucci, Tiffany Target Chinese Banks, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:00 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-china-usa-banks-fakes-idUSTRE7931ND201 
11004. 
 8. See Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 145. 
 9. Id.  
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including [bank] accounts.”10 Plaintiffs’ request was granted in a 
preliminary injunction order by a U.S. district judge.11 Shortly thereafter, 
plaintiffs served the preliminary injunction on the Banks, along with 
subpoenas pursuant to FRCP 45, seeking those documents specified in the 
preliminary injunction in the Banks’ possession, custody, or control.12  
B. GUCCI AMERICA, INC. V. WEIXING LI  
In June 2010, Gucci America, Inc. (a subsidiary of Gucci North 
American Holdings, Inc., itself a subsidiary of Gucci Group N.V.) and 
certain of its affiliates brought a trademark infringement claim under the 
Lanham Act, the primary U.S. federal trademark statute, in the S.D.N.Y. 
against owners and operators of a Chinese website selling counterfeit 
goods.13 The original complaint named the defendant’s website, 
Myluxurybags.com, which, while it had been operating, had described itself 
to its online customers as offering “an extensive selection of authentic 
Gucci, Prada, and Fendi accessories . . . and other leather accessories for 
today’s designer fashion at discount prices.” A classic Gucci handbag with 
interlocking G’s, made of Gucci’s signature fabric, was listed at $420 on 
Myluxurybags.com compared to its $880 retail price.14 
Plaintiffs had evidence indicating that the profits from defendant’s 
allegedly illicit operation were wired to specific accounts at the Chinese 
headquarters of the BOC.15 The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary 
injunction and, following the terms of the injunction, plaintiffs served BOC 
with a subpoena pursuant to FRCP 45 that directed it to turn over 
documents in its possession related to accounts that plaintiffs alleged were 
“critical to their investigation of defendants’ alleged counterfeiting 
operations.”16 
C. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. FORBSE  
In July 2011, Tiffany & Co. filed suit in the S.D.N.Y. against the 
defendants for selling counterfeit Tiffany items through a number of 
websites, including Tiffany-Collections.com, Tiffany-Gifts.com, Tiffany-
Jewelries.us, Tiffanyinsidesales.com, UK-Tiffany-Gifts.com, 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 146. 
 13. Complaint, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2011), 2010 WL 2719026.  
 14. See MyLuxuryBags.com Screenshot History, Screenshot Taken May 28, 2009, 
SCREENSHOTS, http://www.screenshots.com/myluxurybags.com/2009-05-28 (last visited June 5, 
2013).  
 15. See Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1.  
 16. Id. at *1, *2.  
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Best10brands.com, and Trusted-Seller.eu.17 As in Tiffany v. Qi and Gucci, 
plaintiffs sought from non-party financial institutions—here, CMB, BOC, 
and ICBC—financial records associated with the defendants.18 As in Gucci, 
the court issued a temporary restraining order at that time, which became a 
preliminary injunction in August 2011, requiring the third party financial 
institutions to restrain defendants’ assets, including three accounts at CMB, 
one account at ICBC, and one account at BOC, that PayPal records 
indicated were being used by one of the defendants.19 Additionally, the 
preliminary injunction ordered the Banks to provide plaintiffs with “all 
records in their possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such 
records are maintained in the United States or abroad, concerning the assets 
and financial transactions of Defendants or any other entities acting in 
concert or participation with Defendants.”20  
II. THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND THE ARGUMENTS ASSERTED 
Upon being served with subpoenas, the Chinese banks implicated in 
Tiffany v. Qi, Tiffany v. Forbse, and Gucci responded with almost identical 
arguments in their respective proceedings. In both of the Tiffany cases, each 
of the Banks’ New York branches that received the actual physical process 
of the subpoenas conducted a search of its database and found none of the 
information that Tiffany & Co. had requested; they stated that the 
information was located in the database of their Chinese headquarters to 
which they had no access.21 In Tiffany v. Qi, two of the Banks—the New 
York branches of BOC and ICBC—also offered to assist in submitting a 
discovery request to Chinese authorities pursuant to the Hague Convention, 
a proposition that was rejected by the plaintiffs.22 Ultimately, the Banks 
asserted two arguments against the subpoena: (1) The New York branches 
of the Banks “had no access to or control over any customer accounts or . . . 
information located outside the United States,” and (2) complying with the 
subpoena would cause the Banks to be in violation of Chinese law.23 
In Gucci, BOC (the only Chinese bank that was implicated in the case) 
produced documents located in its New York branch that fell within the 
category of documents requested by the plaintiffs but did not produce any 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Complaint at 3, 4–5, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866 
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012), 2011 WL 2883566 at *1–2. 
 18. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1. 
 19. Id. at *1–2. 
 20. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 21. See id. at *2, *3; Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 148, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 22. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 146. 
 23. Id. at 146, 151 (internal quotations omitted); see also Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 
1918866, at *2.  
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documents located in its Chinese headquarters.24 Like the Banks in both of 
the Tiffany cases, BOC asserted that (1) it did not have “possession, 
custody, or control” over the documents located in China, and (2) 
compliance with the subpoena would violate Chinese law, and thus any 
request must be made under the Hague Convention.25 
Thus, two legal issues are raised in all three cases: (1) whether the New 
York branches of Chinese banks have “possession, custody, or control” of 
the documents located in China from a legal standpoint, and (2) more 
importantly (and controversially) for the purposes of this paper, whether a 
request for the production of documents should be made under the Hague 
Convention because production under the subpoena would contravene 
Chinese law. 
Each court in the two Tiffany cases and in the Gucci case quickly 
dispensed with the first legal issue, finding that the banks’ assertions—(1) 
that the New York branches of the banks had separate databases from their 
Chinese headquarters, and (2) that the bank personnel in the New York 
branches could not compel the bank personnel in China to produce the 
documents sought—were irrelevant. All three courts reasoned that the 
subpoenas were directed at the banks as a whole, not solely the New York 
branches of the banks, which were not considered separate entities from 
their offices in China.26 Thus, all three courts held that the Chinese banks, 
including their New York branches, had “possession,” “custody,” and 
“control” over the documents requested notwithstanding the documents’ 
location abroad.27 
The agreement between the courts, however, came to an end in 
addressing the second legal issue—whether a request for documents should 
be made under the Hague Convention rather than U.S. federal discovery 
rules due to a conflict of laws. 
III. THE COMITY ANALYSIS: SAME TEST, DIFFERENT 
RESULTS 
In both Tiffany cases and the Gucci case, the assertion that there is a 
conflict of laws between U.S. discovery rules and Chinese banking laws 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2011).  
 25. Id.  
 26. See id. at *4 n.6; Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 149–50; Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 
1918866, at *3 (reasoning that “the Banks’ New York branches are not subsidiaries of a foreign 
parent company, but rather are ‘branches of the same corporate entities as their counterparts in 
China.’ . . . ‘[T]here is a presumption that a corporation is in the possession and control of its own 
books and records.’” (quoting Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 147 n.1) (also quoting First Nat’l City 
Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1959)).  
 27. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *3; Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 149–50; see 
Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *4 n.6.  
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was uncontested and accepted. Various Chinese banking laws allegedly 
conflicted with U.S. laws in both cases, including, inter alia: 
 Article 6 of the Commercial Bank Law, stating that 
“commercial banks shall safeguard the legal rights and interests 
of depositors against the encroachment of any entity or 
individual”;28 
 Article 24 of the Corporate Deposit Regulation, stating that “a 
financial institution shall keep secret the deposits of corporate 
depositors”;29 
 The Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions’ 
Assistance in the Inquiry into, Freeze, or Deduction of 
Deposits, requiring that any of the foregoing actions may be 
taken only if (1) the request for inquiry into, freezing, or 
debiting funds is from an “authorized governmental entity” and 
(2) such authorized governmental agency presents the bank 
with a notice confirming the latter’s assistance with the inquiry 
into, or freezing, or deduction of funds;30 
 Various damages provisions, providing for fines of up to RMB 
500,000 Yuan, civil liability, and disciplinary punishment for 
personnel by the institution itself;31 and 
 Article 253(A) of China’s Criminal Law, providing for criminal 
liability with a term of imprisonment of up to three years for 
personnel at financial institutions who illegally provide 
personal information of citizen account holders to others in 
violation of Chinese law.32 
After acknowledging the clear existence of a conflict of laws, the courts 
performed a comity analysis pursuant to Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law section 442(1)(c) to determine whether the Chinese banks 
must comply with the subpoena, notwithstanding a potential conflict with 
Chinese law.33 Section 442(1)(c) requires the consideration of five factors: 
(1) “the importance of the documents or information requested to the 
litigation”; (2) “the degree of specificity of the request”; (3) “whether the 
information originated in the United States”; (4) “the availability of 
alternative means of retrieving the information”; and (5) “the extent to 
which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 150. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 31. Id. (referring to Article 73 of the Commercial Bank Law with regard to monetary fines and 
civil liability and Article 78 of the Commercial Bank Law with regard to disciplinary punishment 
by the institution itself).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866, at *4–11 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2012); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *5–12 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011); Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151–60.  
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of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine the 
important interests of the state where the information is located.”34 
The courts found for the plaintiffs on factors one and two35 and for the 
Chinese banks on factor three regarding the origin of the documents 
sought.36 However, the courts differed in their analyses of factors four and 
five. 
A. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. QI ANDREW 
In Tiffany v. Qi, Judge Pitman found that, under the fourth comity 
factor, a request under the Hague Convention was an alternative means for 
the plaintiffs to obtain the documents they sought.37 Tiffany & Co. argued 
that the Hague Convention in China was futile, citing Milliken & Co v. 
Bank of China.38 The Banks argued that Milliken had been based in part on 
language from the U.S. State Department’s website, which had previously 
stated: 
 
While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China pursuant 
to a letter rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence Convention), such 
requests have not been particularly successful in the past. . . . It is not 
unusual for no reply to be received or after a considerable time has 
elapsed, for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American 
court with no indication that the request will eventually be executed.39 
 
The Tiffany v. Qi court agreed with the Banks that the removal of this 
critical language from the State Department’s website “implie[d] that the 
conditions described by the omitted language no longer exist.”40 The court 
did not consider the expert witness testimony presented on behalf of either 
side regarding China’s propensity to comply with a Hague Convention 
request, since it found that the experts had come to divergent conclusions 
based on the same empirical data.41 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151. 
 35. Both courts found that (1) the documents requested were critical to revealing the identity 
of other individuals involved in defendants’ alleged counterfeiting operation, and (2) the request 
was sufficiently specific. See Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *5; Gucci, 2011 WL 
6156936, at *5–6; Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151–52.  
 36. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *5–6; Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *6; Tiffany v. 
Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 152.  
 37. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 152–53.  
 38. Id. at 154 (citing Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)) 
(rejecting the proposition that documents could be easily obtained in China through the Hague 
Convention). 
 39. Id. (citing former language from U.S. State Department’s website).  
 40. Id.   
 41. Id. at 154–55.  
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Finally, the court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that China’s 
Article 23 Reservation under the Convention—specifying that only requests 
for documents that are clearly enumerated and direct or close to the subject 
matter of litigation would be executed—constituted persuasive evidence 
that China would not execute the request.42 
In its examination of the fifth comity factor—the extent to which 
noncompliance with the request for documents undermines important U.S. 
or Chinese interests—the court balanced the competing state interests and 
concluded that the Chinese interest in protecting its account holders’ 
confidentiality was “more significant” than the U.S. interest in enforcing 
and protecting the rights of trademark holders.43 The court relied most 
heavily on two facts: (1) the severity of the Chinese banking laws, which 
had “few exceptions and . . . harsh consequences for violations,”44 and (2) 
the Banks’ non-party status.45 The court distinguished a prior case, Gucci 
America, Inc. v. Curveal Fashion (Curveal),46 which had concluded that the 
U.S. interest trumped Malaysia’s interest in bank secrecy, finding that 
Chinese banking laws had more regulations and fewer exceptions than the 
Malaysian banking laws.47 
B. GUCCI AMERICA, INC. V. WEIXING LI 
In Gucci, Judge Sullivan expressly disagreed with Judge Pitman 
regarding factor four—whether a Hague Convention request to China was 
an “alternative means” for plaintiffs to obtain the documents sought. The 
Gucci court addressed Judge Pitman’s reasoning head-on: 
 
[W]hile the Court agrees with Judge Pitman that “there is a dearth of 
information as to the current efficiency” of Hague Convention requests in 
China, the Court is reluctant to discount Plaintiffs’ evidence and the case 
law cited above solely because of an unexplained revision to the State 
Department’s website. Without concrete evidence suggesting that China’s 
compliance with Hague Convention requests has, in fact, dramatically 
improved, the Court is inclined to defer to the authorities cited above that 
have found that Hague Convention requests in circumstances similar to 
                                                                                                                 
 42. First, the court noted that thirty-six other Hague Convention signatories had also adopted 
the Article 23 reservation (including the United Kingdom and Switzerland); and, second, the court 
reasoned that the documents would meet the requirements of the Article 23 reservation. See id. at 
155–56.  
 43. Id. at 158.  
 44. Id.   
 45. Id. at 158, 160.  
 46. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion (Curveal), No. 09 Civ. 8458, 2010 WL 808639 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010). 
 47. See Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 157.  
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those presented here are not a viable alternative method of securing the 
information Plaintiffs seek.48 
Judge Sullivan also disagreed with Judge Pitman’s reasoning that 
because a request under the Convention would not be “futile,” it fell within 
factor four as a “viable alternative.”49 The Gucci court stated that a finding 
that there was some likelihood of compliance with the Convention did not 
end the inquiry; rather, the particular facts of the case had to be scrutinized 
to determine the “likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove 
effective.”50 Thus, the court here seemed to require a higher probability that 
the Convention request would be honored in China as compared to the 
Tiffany v. Qi court. 
In balancing the states’ interests under the fifth factor, Judge Sullivan 
again came to a different conclusion than Judge Pitman, finding that the 
U.S. interest in enforcing the Lanham Act outweighed China’s “limited” 
interest in enforcing Chinese bank secrecy laws.51 In particular, the Gucci 
court reasoned that the fact that the protections under China’s bank secrecy 
laws could be waived by individuals and certain public bodies (specifically, 
the “people’s court,” “taxation authority,” “public security organ,” 
“industrial commercial administrative organ,” and “securities regulation 
organ”) suggested that these laws “merely confer an individual privilege on 
customers rather than reflect a national policy entitled to substantial 
deference.”52 
C. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. FORBSE 
When it came to assessing the alternative means of securing the 
requested information under factor four of the comity analysis, Judge 
Buchwald in Tiffany v. Forbse, like Judge Pitman in Tiffany v. Qi, found for 
the Banks. Tiffany & Co. argued before Buchwald that despite the fact that 
Judge Pitman had entered a Hague Convention request in November 2011, 
no response had been forthcoming from the Banks in the six intervening 
months.53 The Banks replied that China had executed thirty-seven requests 
for evidence in the first half of 2010.54 Despite the six-month delay in 
answering the Hague Convention request entered into following the 
decision in Tiffany v. Qi, Judge Buchwald concluded that it would be 
prudent to wait before jumping to conclusions that any such Hague 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2011). 
    49. Id. at *7–9, *11 n.8.    
 50. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).  
 51. Id. at *11.  
 52. Id. at *10.  
 53. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 
2012).  
 54. Id.  
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Convention requests would be ignored until Chinese authorities had 
demonstrated concretely that they would fail to comply with similar 
requests after having a sufficient opportunity to comply.55 
However, when balancing the competing national interests under factor 
five, Judge Buchwald departed from Judge Pitman’s conclusion in Tiffany 
v. Qi. Judge Pitman had indicated in his decision that the Chinese interest in 
protecting its account holders’ secrecy was more significant than U.S. 
trademark enforcement interests.56 Instead, while Judge Buchwald 
acknowledged the letter submitted by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to four judges of 
the S.D.N.Y. with similar cases pending, urging that they follow Judge 
Pitman’s approach in seeking evidence under the Hague Convention, Judge 
Buchwald questioned the extent of the Chinese government’s interests by 
pointing out that numerous Chinese government organizations have been 
endowed with the ability to override confidentiality provisions which “only 
underscores the notion that secrecy laws were not designed to protect 
Chinese citizens who engage in unlawful behavior.”57 Unlike Judge 
Sullivan’s conclusion in Gucci, however, Judge Buchwald ruled that, on 
balance, factor five did not tilt the balance in favor of either Tiffany & Co. 
or the defendants.58 
Furthermore, Judge Buchwald noted that BOC continued to act as the 
acquiring bank for TiffanyOutletStore.com after it was notified of the 
preliminary injunction.59 BOC’s defense was that it would be an “enormous 
burden” to investigate all merchants globally to ascertain whether or not 
these merchants were associated with the defendant.60 Judge Buchwald 
rejected this contention, pointing out that the word “Tiffany” was in the 
name of the counterfeiting site, which a simple database search could have 
easily unveiled.61 Consequently, Judge Buchwald concluded that BOC was 
acting in bad faith and must comply with the federal subpoena, whereas the 
other two banks, ICBC and CMB, could be queried through a Hague 
Convention request.62 
IV.  ATTITUDES AND ANXIETIES UNVEILED: A SWISS BANK 
COMPARISON AND MEDIA PORTRAYALS 
The U.S. State Department’s retraction of negative language from its 
website concerning the unlikelihood of successfully obtaining information 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id.  
 56. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 156–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 57. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *8.  
 58. Id. at *9.  
 59. Id. at *10.  
 60. Id.   
    61. Id.   
 62. Id.   
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pursuant to a Hague Convention request in China63 was critical to Judge 
Pitman’s finding in Tiffany v. Qi that the “availability of alternative means 
of retrieving the information” under factor four of the comity analysis 
favored the Banks. Judge Pitman reasoned that a Hague Convention request 
was not an “avenue [that] is futile,”64 and noted that “it appears that the 
Chinese courts have increased the execution of [Hague] requests over time . 
. . . albeit at a rate that is likely not ideal for plaintiffs.”65 By contrast, Judge 
Sullivan in Gucci disagreed; the fact that an avenue was not “futile” was not 
sufficient to find in favor of BOC on factor four.66 The Gucci court was not 
persuaded by BOC’s argument that the empirical data presented by the 
plaintiffs were based in part on stale language from the Department of 
State’s website, and thus, should be discounted. While Judge Sullivan 
agreed with the Tiffany v. Qi court that “there is a dearth of information as 
to the current efficiency” of Hague Convention requests in China, he 
required affirmative evidence that China’s compliance with Hague 
Convention requests had “dramatically improved,” and gave little weight to 
the revision to the State Department’s website.67 Ultimately, the Gucci court 
found that factor four favored the plaintiffs, reasoning that a Hague 
Convention request was not a “viable alternative method.”68 
Judge Sullivan seemed to read a likelihood of success qualification into 
factor four—that the “availability of alternative means” needed to be 
alternative means that were actually “viable” or likely to succeed. Judge 
Sullivan’s more stringent definition of what constituted “alternative means” 
under factor four was necessarily informed and influenced by his 
determination that factor five, the balance of national interests, weighed in 
favor of U.S. interests. In other words, because Judge Sullivan thought that 
China’s interest in banking secrecy was “limited,” it was apparently easier 
for him to require a stronger showing of China’s likelihood of compliance 
with a Hague Convention request. Such an approach, in these authors’ 
opinions, underestimates China’s sovereignty and interest in protecting its 
banks’ confidential information. 
By contrast, because Judge Pitman found in Tiffany v. Qi that China’s 
interest was “significant,”69 he was less willing to encroach on Chinese 
sovereignty by requiring the Banks to comply with U.S. law (and thus, 
violate Chinese law) unless alternative means of obtaining the desired 
information through a Hague Convention request were futile. Furthermore, 
in balancing the competing state interests, the Gucci court never recognized 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 64. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 65. Id. at 156. 
 66. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2011).  
 67. Id. at *9.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 156, 160.  
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that BOC was not actually a party to the litigation—a fact that the Tiffany v. 
Qi court found strengthened China’s interest in enforcing banking laws that 
protect its banks’ account holders’ confidentiality.70 
While only so much can be extrapolated from comparing Gucci and 
both of the Tiffany cases, a survey of the U.S. case law addressing other 
countries’ conflicting bank secrecy laws reveals more. In an article on the 
publicized 2009 United States v. UBS AG case,71 in which the U.S. 
government went after Swiss bank accounts being used to evade federal 
taxes, the author describes the case’s result as an “attack on Swiss banking 
sovereignty.”72 In UBS, the parties ultimately arrived at a settlement 
agreement in which UBS, a Swiss bank governed by Swiss bank secrecy 
laws, would reveal account information concerning certain U.S. account 
holders.73 The agreement departed from UBS’s initial position, which was 
backed by the Swiss government, to withhold the names of U.S. account 
holders who were UBS customers that had failed to meet federal tax 
obligations.74 Even though UBS is distinguishable on several levels,75 the 
characterization of the U.S. legal system’s disregard for Swiss banking laws 
as an “attack” on Swiss sovereignty can be instructive in thinking about the 
Gucci court’s willingness to sidestep Chinese banking law in favor of U.S. 
discovery rules. 
Because Chinese bank secrecy laws would be violated by enforcing 
U.S. discovery rules in Tiffany v. Qi and Gucci, at first glance, the outcome 
of each of these cases seems to necessarily prioritize the laws of one 
sovereign to the detriment of the other’s legal system—in other words, by 
finding in favor of the Banks, the Tiffany v. Qi court deferred to Chinese 
sovereignty over U.S. sovereignty, while Gucci’s deference to U.S. 
discovery rules infringed China’s sovereign interests in protecting its 
depositors’ confidential information. However, comparing the degree of 
harm to Chinese sovereignty in Gucci versus U.S. sovereignty in Tiffany v. 
Qi reveals an important difference in the extent to which each sovereign’s 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See id. at 158, 160. 
 71. United States v. UBS AG, No. 09 Civ. 20423, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009). 
 72. Beckett G. Cantley, The UBS Case: The U.S. Attack on Swiss Banking Sovereignty, 7 
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 1, 23–24 (2010–2011), available at 
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 73. Id.  
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 75. Importantly, in UBS, the SEC sought Swiss bank accounts held by U.S. citizens, and under 
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Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov 
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/mutual.aspx. Nevertheless, the treaty does not protect the Swiss 
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under Swiss laws against UBS for disclosing information. See Cantley, supra note 72, at 25. This 
is the same problem that confronts the Chinese banks in the Tiffany cases and Gucci.  
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interests are protected. Ultimately, the Tiffany v. Qi court did not preclude 
the asserted U.S. interest in protecting and enforcing trademarks by finding 
in favor of the Banks; rather, the court forced plaintiffs to use an 
intermediary body—the Hague Convention—to obtain the information 
sought in a way that would not contravene Chinese law. By contrast, the 
Gucci opinion directly contravened China’s interest in protecting its bank 
secrecy laws, and consequently, its interest in increasing consumer 
confidence in its fledgling banking system. In other words, complying with 
the U.S. subpoenas in each case means violating Chinese law, whereas 
using the Hague Convention, to which the U.S. is a willing party, as an 
alternative means to obtain information does not violate U.S. or Chinese 
law while still advancing the United States’ sovereign interest in protecting 
U.S. trademarks. 
While one can reasonably question the certainty of successfully 
obtaining documents under the Hague Convention in China, this uncertainty 
should be insufficient to eschew China’s interest in its bank secrecy laws. 
The Tiffany cases and the Gucci case portray this unfairness because, in 
these cases, the banks themselves were not parties to the litigation and were 
not alleged to have violated any U.S. laws. 
As discussed above, the UBS case is only instructive insofar as it 
illuminates a potential political rationale for the Gucci court’s decision to 
order BOC to comply with U.S. federal discovery rules. Indeed, using the 
UBS case as a frame of reference for how U.S. courts deal with non-party 
foreign banks in discovery is unhelpful, since the facts of UBS are 
dramatically different than those of both of the Tiffany cases and the Gucci 
case. However, jurisprudence exists that allows one to identify differences 
in how the courts evaluate cases with similar sets of facts, but involve banks 
from Western countries.  
In SEC v. Stanford International Bank Ltd,76 where a Swiss unit of 
Paris-based bank Société Générale SA (“SG Suisse”) was a non-party 
recipient of a discovery request under the FRCP, the Northern District of 
Texas held that discovery should first proceed under the Hague Convention 
“in the interest of comity.”77 Like the Chinese banks in the Tiffany cases 
and the Gucci case, SG Suisse argued for utilizing discovery procedures 
under the Hague Convention because compliance with the discovery 
request under the FRCP would subject the bank and its employees to 
penalties under Swiss law.78 While the Stanford International court aligned 
with the Gucci court in assessing most of the comity factors, the discourse 
                                                                                                                 
 76. SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd, 776 F. Supp. 2d 323 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 
 77. Id. at 342.  
 78. See Nolan Godberg, Third Party Discovery of Foreign Bank Records Should First Proceed 
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surrounding factors four and five—assessing alternative means of obtaining 
the information and balancing competing national interests—differed 
significantly. 
In Stanford International, the court limited its discussion of factor four 
to whether the documents sought could be geographically obtained 
elsewhere, as opposed to whether the documents could be obtained through 
other means (i.e., through a Hague Convention request as analyzed in each 
of the Tiffany cases and the Gucci case).79 The court did not even mention 
the Hague Convention until it addressed factor five. 
The court found comity factor five neutral, stating that “the [Hague] 
Convention inherently, and adequately, balances the competing sovereign 
interests here because its use will benefit U.S. interests by providing the 
needed evidence, and protect Swiss interests by avoiding intrusions upon 
Swiss sovereignty.”80 The court first acknowledged the “compelling 
interests at stake” of both the United States and Switzerland.81 Regarding 
the Swiss banking laws, the court focused on Switzerland’s “long-standing . 
. . tradition that places great value on the sovereign independence of the 
nation . . . [which] is embodied in . . . bank secrecy statues that have the 
legitimate purpose of protecting commercial privacy inside and outside 
Switzerland.”82 However, the court refrained from balancing the competing 
national interests at stake, which it saw as an “inherently political” inquiry, 
and opined that courts “generally are not the proper bodies to weigh which 
sovereign’s interests are more meritorious.”83 Ultimately, the court 
determined that the Hague Convention itself embodied the legislative 
decisions of both countries that had agreed to become signatories to the 
Convention, and thus, necessarily struck the right balance and allowed both 
U.S. and Swiss interests to be served.84 
Although Stanford International was decided in the Fifth Circuit, it 
predated both of the Tiffany cases and Gucci; yet, neither of the Tiffany 
cases nor the Gucci case adopted, let alone addressed, Stanford 
International’s language or analysis about the Hague Convention itself 
striking a balance between competing national interests in factor five of the 
comity analysis. Furthermore, the Chinese bank cases’ extensive discussion 
of whether a Hague Convention request would be successful in Switzerland 
was completely absent in Stanford International. Additionally, the court in 
Stanford International found that Swiss banking laws had the “legitimate 
purpose of protecting commercial privacy,” without mentioning and in spite 
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of the prior impropriety by Swiss bank UBS in United States v. UBS AG,85 
which would otherwise suggest an illegitimate underside to Swiss banking 
laws.  
Both of the Tiffany cases and the Gucci case focus critically on whether 
the Chinese government would respect a request for documents made under 
the Hague Convention in determining factor four of the comity analysis—
i.e., in determining whether there are other means available for obtaining 
the information requested. This inquiry is entirely absent from the 
discussion of factor four in Stanford International, presumably because that 
court found it unthinkable that the Swiss government would not comply 
with the Hague Convention. Even in Tiffany v. Qi, where Judge Pitman 
ultimately held that a Hague Convention request is an available alternative 
means, the court reached this result only after an extensive analysis of 
China’s history of noncompliance.86 Judge Sullivan’s determination in 
Gucci that a Hague Convention request would not be “effective” in China, 
however, produced more dramatic effects. Judge Sullivan, in relying on 
scholarship based on the U.S. State Department’s retracted language about 
China’s noncompliance, memorializes distrust of the Chinese government 
in enforcing international treaties, a fact that may no longer be true. 
Furthermore, in ignoring the bank’s non-party status, Judge Sullivan 
seemed to project some culpability on the bank—as if it were partly to 
blame for the counterfeiter’s profiting. The Gucci opinion reinforces the 
notion of a counterfeiting culture in China and a government that is too lax 
towards infringement of intellectual property rights. Finally, the opinion 
suggests that Chinese interests and U.S. interests do not share common 
ground87—unlike Swiss interests, which can be harmonized with U.S. 
interests when the “right balance” is struck.88  
Though the precedential effect of both Tiffany decisions and the Gucci 
decision is unclear—as they may be cabined to Second Circuit 
jurisprudence or simply to their individual facts—they reveal some 
prevailing attitudes and anxieties about China as a member of today’s 
increasingly global marketplace, and specifically, the Chinese government’s 
role in adhering to international standards that are largely dictated by 
Western countries in that marketplace. For example, in January 2012, This 
American Life89 broadcasted an excerpt of Mike Daisey’s one-man 
monologue, The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs. The episode, titled 
Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory, alleged that there were unethical labor 
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practices at Apple’s Foxconn factory in China, including the employment of 
underage workers and unsafe working conditions.90 As a result of the 
allegations, the New York Times ran an incendiary piece titled The 
iEconomy; In China, the Human Costs that are Built into an iPod that 
painted Foxconn, which happens to be the largest private-sector employer 
in China, as willfully blind to its unethical labor practices.91 On March 16, 
2012, however, This American Life retracted Mr. Daisey and the Apple 
Factory because its producers discovered that Daisey had lied during the 
fact-checking process and the show could no longer “vouch for [the story’s] 
truth.”92 Although the initial story was retracted, the damage to Foxconn’s 
reputation had already been done.93 
The Apple-Foxconn controversy shows the media’s readiness to accept 
allegations of impropriety in Chinese business practices and the underlying 
assumption that the Chinese government turns a blind eye to such practices. 
The media’s characterization of the Apple-Foxconn controversy mirrors the 
Gucci court’s unfavorable opinion in its attitude towards big business (or, 
more specifically, banks) in China.  
An article published by The Atlantic suggests why, with particular 
regard to U.S.-China relations, media and law can easily shape one another.  
There are vast differences in political systems and institutions, social 
norms, [and] historical and cultural legacies . . . [between the U.S. and 
China]. Mutual perceptions can get easily skewed, with real repercussions 
for policy. . . . which can be reinforced and perpetuated over time through, 
for example[], domestic media . . . .94 
As China continues to increase its presence in the global marketplace, 
these mutual perceptions come to surface through public discourse, such 
as media and judicial opinions. Because the two Tiffany cases and the 
Gucci case form part of this discourse, a closer look at the language and 
rationale of these cases reveals the Western attitudes that exist towards, 
inter alia, China’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of 
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intellectual property infringement and the validity of China’s interest in 
its bank secrecy laws.  
CONCLUSION 
By validating expert testimony suggesting that the Chinese government 
drags its feet when presented with a Hague Convention request, the Gucci 
court gives this skeptical impression the imprimatur of fact, in spite of 
evidence that the Chinese government is changing its noncompliant ways. 
The Tiffany v. Qi court, on the other hand, while engaging with the same 
analytical questions as the Gucci court, presents a forward-thinking vision 
for China’s role as a member of the global community. By ordering a 
request through the Hague Convention rather than forcing strict compliance 
with U.S. discovery rules in violation of Chinese law, the court challenges 
the view that the Chinese government refuses to enforce international 
business standards and acknowledges that times are changing, with China 
taking its role as a Hague Convention signatory more seriously. The Tiffany 
v. Forbse court perhaps presents the most impartial view to date: by 
refusing to assume that a Hague Convention request would prove unfruitful 
until concrete evidence is provided after a suitable time period of non-
compliance by Chinese banks, this court shows cautious optimism as to 
China’s improving participation as a member of the international 
community while not entirely ignoring China’s past record. 
 
